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Abstract
This paper considers the effects of the Michigan Merit Award, a college scholarship
program, on high school graduation rates. Students qualify via a standardized high
school proficiency exam. Identification is achieved through difference-in-differences
estimation using both a broad set of controls and a stricter set of controls. The effects
on graduation rates differ depending on the model specification, as some significant
results show a positive correlation between the introduction of the program and
graduation rates, while others a negative effect. Where it appears the award increased
graduation rates, pinpointing the exact impact of the award on graduation levels is
difficult because it appears that some of the gains in Michigan were continuations in
existing trends. Other significant results shed some more light on educational inputs
and their effects on graduation. Results are inconclusive on net, but tend to reject
the notion that the award led to increased graduation rates.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This paper studies the effects of a particular merit-based scholarship program on
district-level graduation rates in the State of Michigan. This introduction provides an
overview of the field of education economics, discuss some seminal research in the field,
and brings to light some recent research related to merit aid. While most research in
this field has studied the effect of merit awards on gains in college attendance and/or
completion, the contribution of this paper is different. Rather than looking at how
scholarship programs effect college attendance, this paper focuses on the effects of
scholarship awards on a step required to go to college: high school graduation.
A difference-in-differences estimation approach is utilized with both a broad
set of control districts and a stricter set, controlling for various factors that may
affect graduation rates. Three different model specifications will be used in this
study applied to a larger set of controls and also a stricter set of controls. Some
specifications find that the introduction of the Michigan Merit award is associated
with higher graduation rates. Another specification finds that these increases may
be continuations of pre-existing upward trends in graduation rates. Still another
specification finds that the introduction of the award program was associated with
lower levels of graduation rates in Michigan.
1
1.1 Beginnings of Education Economics
“Educational production functions” is one approach for studying the impacts on
educational outputs used by economists. The output in an educational production
function is achievement. This refers to some sort of cognitive output, or more con-
cretely, some academic achievement like high school graduation, college attendance,
labor market outcomes, or standardized test scores. The inputs to this type of
function include things like family, schools, peers, neighborhoods, innate ability, etc.
The idea of education production functions was prompted by the Coleman Report,
named after the lead sociologist who did the study in 1966 (Coleman et al., 1966).
Many argued that this study provided evidence that school funding has little effect
on student achievement, while others pointed out the the study reports that student
background and socioeconomic status are more important in determining student
outcomes. The notion that increased resources, particularly per pupil spending, has
little effect on increasing education outcomes of students was somewhat supported
by a work by Eric Hanushek thirty years later (Hanushek, 1996). This study also
showed many implications regarding race and educational outcomes that stirred up
much controversy at the time. Naturally, this study (funded by the U.S. Department
of Education) prompted many more studies and economists became increasingly
involved.
1.2 Incentives for Academic Performance
Rewards for good grades are prominent in our society. It could be in the form of a
pizza party, a sleepover, a new toy, a trip to the fair, or cash. Apparently many parents
recognize the idea that some sort of incentive would entice their child to do better in
school. What parents may not have explicitly understood was the underpinnings of
economics as they were incentivizing their children as students. Some students may
have already done well academically and never had incentives like those mentioned
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above offered to them. If a student is already making top grades (e.g., all As),
incentives are likely to have minimal effect. More often, incentives are given to affect
marginal behavior. Oftentimes, an incentive is offered for academic performance to
push a student from one grade tier to another. For example, a student that is failing
math class may be offered an award to reach a passing grade. In this case, the margin
is the grading cutoff between a grade of an F and a D (e.g., attempting to push a
student past the 60% grade). As is common, a student is stronger in some subjects in
comparison to others. Perhaps parents would use a tiered system to induce students.
For example, each A is worth $20, each B is worth $10, each C is worth $5, and each
D is worth $1. These incentives are more likely to work for students on the margin.
A student with a B in English class may be incentived to break into the A range, a
student with a D in science class may be incentived into the C range, and so on. In
other words, these incentives are intended to affect the marginal behavior of students.
A student on the fence about trying harder in his or her classes may be incentived to
do so via incentivizing rewards.
This idea was studied in a recent field experiment in Chicago by a group of
economists (Levitt et al., 2012). To better understand incentives that best drive
youth to do better in school, they explored various incentive schemes to see what
worked best. They explored the short-term effects of incentives on student effort and
performance, varying both the size and type of the rewards as well as their framing.
They offered these awards (both cash and otherwise) both immediately and with a
delay. They councluded that incentives do matter, and the impact of these incentives
heightens if framed as a loss. They also concluded that broadening the scope of
awards to include both financial and non-financial awards can be beneficial. One of
the most important takeaways of this study is that the timing of the payoffs matter
significantly. Effort is far removed from payoff for these children. They have a hard
time connecting the effort and the award in a useful way if the timing between the
two is too vast (Levitt et al., 2012). Although this study focused on younger children,
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these results are likely to apply more broadly. More specifically, timing of incentives
may very well matter for incentives tied to high school graduation.
A study in Israel examined the effect of incentives on matriculation exams. These
exams are a requirement to enroll at a postsecondary institution in Israel. The par-
ticular program studied provided cash awards for low-achieving high school students.
This intervention offered rewards for both exam completion and performance with
direct payments to students. These rewards were randomly assigned to different
schools in Israel and the students became aware of the award one-third of the way
into the school year, right before a “big push” in studying takes place. The researchers
found that these direct cash rewards in low-achieving schools generated substantial
increases in the matriculation rates of girls. There seemed to be no effect on boys
in general or on girls not on the margin (Angrist and Lavy, 2009). Still, this study
shows that incentives can affect education outcomes, especially groups on the margin
of passing some necessary exam.
College scholarships work the same way in many aspects. College scholarship
awards could very well affect the marginal behavior of students in several ways. A
high school student on the fence about going to college may be incentivized via a
scholarship program. Since they are making a human capital decision, they have
to decide whether to go to college or to enter the workforce. The opportunity cost
of attending college is foregone wages that could be made while attending college.
Most students are aware that attending college leads to higher lifetime earnings and
weigh their options accordingly. Students are also aware of the costs of attending
college and make decisions based on the costs. A student may very well want to go to
college, but have insufficient funds to do so. A scholarship that pays for a student’s
costs may certainly incentivize students like this to attend college. It is important
to note that scholarships may be given to students who would have attended college
regardless of the existence of a scholarship and would therefore not affect their college-
going behavior at all (although it may push students with limited resources to more
expensive schools depending on the nature of the scholarship). Oftentimes, college
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scholarships are based purely on the academic performance of a student. If a student
is certain about attending college at the start of high school, their behavior may very
well reflect that intention via academic performance while in high school.
1.3 Merit-Based Scholarship programs
The cost of higher education has risen substantially over the last few decades. The
college wage premium has risen 27% between 1993 and 2005 (Mishel et al., 2007). Real
tuition and fees at public universities has risen 63%, while the same has risen 43%
at private universities (College Board, 2005). Returns to a college degree are great,
so more and more students in the United States need access to a college education.
Because of the rising costs, financial aid of all sorts has become increasingly important.
In 1993, 58.7% of full-time undergraduates received financial aid. That number rose
to 76.1% in 2004 (Snyder et al., 2006)1.
It is a common policy and campaign goal for policymakers and politicians to
improve access to higher education. Naturally, the proposed solutions for this issue
differ. Some argue for financial aid for low-income students, usually dubbed by
the moniker “need-based” financial aid. Others argue for aid based on academic
outcomes in secondary education like grades, test scores, etc. This type of educational
assistance is usually called “merit-based” financial aid. Still others (or those
wanting a compromise) favor a hybrid of these two general types of financial
educational assistance. Federal programs like Pell Grants and government-guaranteed
(and oftentimes interest-free) loans have been implemented to support access to
postsecondary across the nation. A myriad of state and local programs exist for
financial assistance for education as well. State programs vary greatly from state to
state partly because of political and demographic differences. It may also be that each
state’s goals vary as to why they create these financial assistance programs. Heller
1See Table 320 of this work
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and Rogers (2003) posits that states have articulated three primary motivations for
the creation of such programs:
1. Many states want to improve access to higher education simply to promote
college access and attainment. The scholarship program studied in this paper
(the Michigan Merit Award) is an example of this. The law in Michigan
that established this award program stated as a goal that the program would
“increase access to postsecondary education and reward Michigan high school
graduates who have demonstrated academic achievement” (MMA, 1999).
2. It is often true that state programs heavily favor students willing to go to
college in their home state in order to keep young, talented individuals in the
state from which they came. This is an attempt to “staunch the ‘brain drain’ of
the best and brightest students.” Alaska’s UA Scholars Program is an example
of this. As the University of Alaska website states, “The UA Scholars Program
is designed to help reduce the number of Alaska’s high school graduates who
leave the state for education and jobs elsewhere” (Hamilton, 2002).
3. The third primary motivation is to simply encourage and/or reward students
who work hard academically. The Florida statute creating its program,
The Florida Bright Futures Scholarship Program, states that it was created
“to reward any Florida high school graduate who merits recognition of high
academic achievement” (Flo, 1999). The website for West Virginia’s PROMISE
scholarship, meanwhile, cites other states’ experience as evidence that the
program has a motivational effect: “Several other states have found that the
quickest and most effective way to motivate students to study harder and to
achieve in school is to offer good students the opportunity to attend college
tuition free” (PROMISE, 2003).
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1.3.1 Economics Literature on Merit-Based Scholarships
In the following sections, several different merit-based scholarships will be discussed.
Programs from four different states will be discussed in limited detail. Particular
attention will be given to the differing criteria for award attainment. Also, research
and findings about these scholarships in the economics literature will be discussed.
Like all purely merit-based scholarship programs, West Virginia’s PROMISE
(Providing Real Opportunities to Maximize In-State Student Excellence) scholarship
is awarded entirely on a student’s academic record, not financial need. The state
began offering this program in 2002 which covers full tuition and fees for eligible
first-time freshmen who enroll full-time at a West Virginia public four- or two-year
institution. The award could also be used for an “equivalent amount” at an eligible
West Virginia private institution. Eligibility rules have changed several times since
the programs inception, and in early 2009, awards were limited to a fixed dollar
amount that may not cover full tuition at some institutions. To qualify for the award,
incoming college freshmen have to meet both a high school grade point average (GPA)
cutoff (3.0 on a 4.0 scale) and an ACT/SAT score cutoff (21 for ACT, 1000 for SAT).
(It is important to note that both the ACT and SAT are college entrance exams, not
exams to track high school progress.)
Scott-Clayton (2011) studied this West Virginia program and found that it had
significant impacts on many end-of-college outcomes, with particularly large impacts
on time-to-degree. This author utilizes a regression discontinuity approach. Overall,
this paper finds that PROMISE increased the overall BA (bachelor of four-year
degree) attainment rate by 1.8 to 2.3 percentage points. This paper also makes clear
that incentives matter, as do the details of the incentive design. There is evidence
to show that PROMISE would not likely have had the same effect on time-to-degree
had it been designed with no or different strings attached to the award.
The Helping Outstanding Pupils Educationally (HOPE) program in Georgia is
another example of a merit-based scholarship program. It started in 1993 and is
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now argued to be the largest state-run merit scholarship program in the country. A
Georgia student qualifies for the Georgia HOPE program by attaining of a B average
(3.0/4.0 scale) in a selection of core high school subjects (Mumper, 1999). Former
Georgia Governor Miller, the designer of the HOPE program, described the program
this way: “This is not about family income. Its saying to a kid and student that
if you are responsible and keep a B average, you will have the opportunity to go to
college”(Miller, 1993). For HOPE scholars in degree-granting public institutions in
Georgia, the program covers tuition, approved fees, and a book allowance. HOPE
recipients who decide to attend in-state degree-granting private institutions receive a
fixed dollar amount per year for tuition.
Dynarski (2000) studied this program. The results suggest that Georgia’s program
has had a surprisingly large effect on the college attendance rate of middle- and
high-income youth. Using a set of nearby states as a control group and a difference-
in-differences approach, she found that Georgia’s program has likely increased the
college attendance rate among 18- to 19-year-olds by seven to eight percentage points.
She further found that the program’s effect is concentrated among Georgia’s white
students, who experienced a 12.3 percentage point rise in their attendance rate relative
to whites in comparison states. The black attendance rate in Georgia did not increase
relative to that in comparison states after HOPE was introduced. The racial gap in
college attendance in Georgia therefore increased relative to its level in the rest of the
Southeast U.S. The evidence also suggests that Georgia’s program has widened the
gap in college attendance between those from low-income and high-income families.
Cornwell et al. (2006) studied the effects of this program on college attendance
in Georgia. According to their analysis (where the authors utilize a difference-in-
differences empirical strategy), HOPE has raised the first-time-freshmen enrollment
rate in Georgia about 6.9 percentage points, or 9 percent, relative to the rest of
the SREB (Southern Regional Education Board)2. Second, the overall HOPE effect
2Member states include Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and
West Virginia.
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is split between public and private 4-year colleges, while the coefficient estimate
for 2-year schools is small and statistically insignificant. The 4-year results imply
scholarship-induced enrollment rate increases of roughly 12 percent at public colleges
and 20 percent at private colleges. The paper also concludes that seats vacated by
students pursuing 4-year degrees were filled by individuals who would have otherwise
entered the labor market.
The Adams scholarship, another merit-based financial reward, uses college high
school proficiency exams as a qualifier. All high school sophomores in Massachusetts
take the Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS). The test
includes both an English portion and a mathematics portion. The idea of this program
was proposed in January of 2004 by then-Governor Romney. The Abigail and John
Adams Scholarship program would have waived tuition at in-state public college for
any student whose MCAS score placed him or her in the top 25% statewide. The idea
was to help ward off “brain drain” and keep Massachusetts’s brightest students in the
state for college and particularly, public colleges. Concerned that the program would
benefit students from affluent, high-performing areas the most, the Department of
Education approved a revised version of the Adams Scholarship Program in October
2004. Under the modified version, a student receives a tuition waiver if his or her
MCAS score is in the top 25% of the student’s district, scores in the “advanced”
category in one subject, and scores in the “proficient” or “advanced” category in the
other subject.
Goodman (2008) found several interesting conclusions about the Adams Scholar-
ship Program. This author, like many others studying scholarship programs, utilized
a difference-in-differences approach in this analysis. In its first year, the Adams
Scholarship spent $4 million on tuition waivers for over 3000 students attending
in-state colleges. Nearly half of the incoming freshmen classes at University of
Massachusetts campuses were scholarship winners. This paper suggests that 800
students, largely from the 60-79th percentiles in academic skill (as measured by MCAS
scores) would have attended four-year private colleges had the program not existed.
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The paper suggests that this translates into roughly $5,000 per student was spent to
induce student switching to the public university system. With more estimation, the
paper suggests the scholarship’s primary effect was to move students from in-state
private institutions to in-state public colleges. The paper further suggests that the
original motivation for the scholarship may have been misplaced because the state
does not seem to suffer from “brain drain”. The analysis suggests that roughly 5,000
more students enter college in Massachusetts than the state loses to its high school
graduates in other states. Even if all 800 switching students would have left the
state had the program not existed, the benefits would occur only in the long run if
students tended to settle where the attend college. A work by Groen (2004) shows
that only 10% of students induced to stay in-state by similar financial incentives will
remain in the state’s labor market 10 to 15 years later. This would roughly translate
into the program adding 80 workers to the workforce every year at a cost of $50,000
per worker. It seems highly implausible that the benefits to the state in additional
tax revenue would exceed this amount (Goodman, 2008). It is also unlikely that
the proportion of college-educated workers would raise enough to induce the positive
externalities discussed by Moretti (2004).
Before the start of Georgia’s HOPE scholarship, Florida had merit-based schol-
arships in existence that disbursed the largest amount of merit aid of any state
until HOPE came into being. In response to Georgia’s HOPE program, Florida
created the Bright Futures Scholarship program. Bright Futures consolidated all of
Floridas existing merit programs into a single program, while the standards needed
to meet an award were lowered. Like many other scholarship programs, Bright
Futures funding comes from state lottery revenues. It has no income eligibility
gap and awards scholarships for up to four years of undergraduate education. The
program has three types of awards, two for use at one of the state’s degree-granting
institutions (public and private), and one for students attending vocational or
technical postsecondary programs (PEPC, 1999). The criteria include high school
GPA requirments, ACT/SAT score requirements, and, in some cases, community
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service requirements. In the initial year of the Bright Futures program (1997-1998),
$69.6 million was awarded to 43,244 students. In its second year (1998-1999), it
expanded and awarded $93.3 million to 56,281 students. Then, in 1999-2000, $131.5
million was awarded to over 70,000 students (Bureau of Student Financial Assistance,
2000).
1.4 Contribution of this Work
Since the scholarship program studied here uses a high school progress exam as its
qualification, students could qualify for the award without any intention of going to
college. The standard life-cycle model assumes that student debt has only an income
effect on career and other post-college decisions, proportional to the ratio of debt to
the present discounted value of total lifetime earnings. Though debt may account
for just over one percent of lifetime earnings for a typical college graduate, debt may
still matter to young people (Rothstein and Rouse, 2007). It may matter because of
debt aversion (Burdman, 2005), credit constraints,3 or myopia. Therefore, internal,
life-cycle benefits may not be enough to push qualified students into college.
This paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. This paper
studies the Michigan Merit Award scholarship program’s effect on high school
graduation rates rather than college matriculation rates or college completion rates.
Another imporant difference is the fact that the scholarship program studied in this
paper is based solely on high school tests that measure educational progression,
and not a college entrance exam. A student who is on the fence about going to
college (or even graduating high school) may very well be incentivized by a merit-
based scholarship program where long-term in-class effort in high school may not
be necessary. Naturally, there are minimum requirements at most postsecondary
3Cameron and Taber (2004) and Carneiro and Heckman (2002) find little evidence that borrowing
constraints during the college-going years are not important determinants of college attendance while
Ellwood and Kane (2000) finds that differences in college attendance by family income are partly
explained by credit constraints.
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institutions for matriculation. However, many students may meet these with
“normal” amounts of effort (relative to the individual student). These same students
may not have the ability to do better than this or are not incentivized to do better.
For these students, college may not seem like a viable option because of the costs
associated with attending college. Moreover, some of these students may make the
same life-cycle choices about graduating from high school. Some students may feel as
if they are “disenfranchised” and may not find the benefits of completing high school
enough to enduce them to stay in school and graduate. This could certainly be the
case if a student’s dream of attending college seems fruitless as they try as hard as
they can and still not keep up with the academic requirements necessary for college
matriculation. It could also be the case for those students whose aspirations of going
to college seem dismal if they perceive their grades in high school to be behind the
usual standards of traditional, institution-awarded scholarships. If students perceive
that going to college is an impossibility, they may very well leave high school.
Graduating high school is an obvious intermediate step to attending college.
Students may not put much effort into high school proficiency exams when there
is not an incentive tied to it. School administrators have incentives for the students
in their schools to do well, but ususally the reward to the student is either small or
unnoticeable. It could be the case that students miss school or assume the idea of
a “free day” when proficiency exams are given. A reward tied to the exams may
incentivize students to try harder (or try at all). A program with a reward tied to
these exams, like the Michigan Merit Award, may incentivize students to try harder
on the exams. This could be especially true for students with intentions to go to
college. This effort may be put forth by the “disenfranchised” students described
above because they see both a reward and an increased likelihood of their chances of
attending college. These same students may see a benefit in not only giving a whole-
hearted attempt on the proficiency exam, but staying in school and graduating high
school in order to attend a postsecondary educational institution. In other words,
the Michigan Merit Award may increase high school graduation rates if it does, in
12
fact, make a difference to students who are otherwise on the margin about attending
college and therefore move ahead by graduating high school. Even though the stated
goal of the award program studied in this paper was to increase access to college
education, there may be unintended consequences associated with this program that
affect high school graduation rates. The Michigan Merit Award program itself will
be explained in detail in the next chapter.
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Chapter 2
Michigan Merit Award
2.1 Michigan Educational Assessment Program
The Michigan Educational Assessment Program (MEAP) is a standardized test taken
by Michigan students. MEAP tests were first taken in public schools in the school
year 1969-70. It was initially started by Michigan’s State Board of Education and was
supported by then-Governor William G. Millken. Its goal, as with many standardized
tests, is to measure student progress at different points in their academic careers in
comparison to state-set standards.
The exam is taken by elementary, middle, and high school students. The exam is
required for all Michigan public school students1 and not necessarily required for
private school students. The MEAP exam contains four subject areas: English
Language Arts (Reading and Writing), Mathematics, Science, and Social Studies.
It should be noted that the MEAP exam was replaced by the Michigan Merit Exam
(MME) for high school students in 2007 in response to the No Child Left Behind
Act (NCLB) federal legislation passed in 2001. This is outside the time frame of this
study and does not affect the analysis. The exam is still taken by students in grades
1Parents may choose to exempt their children from taking the exams in some cases. Exceptions
can also be made for special needs students in Michigan public schools.
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3-9. For each of the subject areas tested, students are rated at one of the following
four levels:
• Level 1: Advanced (exceeded standards)
• Level 2: Proficient (met standards)
• Level 3: Partially proficient (basic)
• Level 4: Not proficient (apprentice)
Ideally, students score at a Level 2 or above to show adequate proficiency. As with
many other standardized tests, schools with too many students scoring low could be
penalized by the state while schools with a large proportion of high-scorers could
receive financial rewards.
The exam has both multiple choice and open ended questions.
Figure 2.1: Sample Multiple Choice Question
An example of each type of question for the math portion of the exam are shown
in Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2.
15
Figure 2.2: Sample Open Answer Question
2.2 Passage of the Michigan Merit Award Schol-
arship Act
In his 1999 State of the State Address,2 the then-Governor John Engler of Michigan
announced he would introduce legislation to create the Michigan Merit Award. He
stated that the award was “for all Michigan high school graduates who master
reading, writing, math, and science”(Engler, 1999). Governor Engler proposed that
2January 28, 1999
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the program be funded from a portion of the state’s share of tobacco settlement
funds. The stated goal of the legislation was “to increase access to postsecondary
education and reward Michigan high school graduates who have demonstrated
academic achievement” (MMA, 1999). Funding for the program was set by the
legislation at 30 percent of the tobacco settlement total in fiscal year 2000, 50 percent
in 2001, and 75 percent in 2002 and subsequent years.
2.3 Award Qualifications
The Michigan Merit Award Scholarship Act provided scholarships of up to $2,500 for
students who:
1. Took all four subject area tests
2. Scored at Level 1 (“exceeds Michigan standards”) or Level 2 (“meets Michigan
standards”) on all four portions of the Michigan Assessment Program High
School Test (MEAP HST). 3
The MEAP tests are a criterion-referenced test designed to measure knowledge of the
state’s designated curricular frameworks. The tests are given in the aforementioned
four subject areas: mathematics, reading, science, and writing. Although the vast
majority of scholarship recepients qualify through the MEAP HST, the legislation also
provides an alternative path for qualifying for the scholarship. (Most years during
this study, the number of students qualifying for the Michigan Merit Award via these
alternative paths were either zero or negligible and will be ignored in this study. The
steps are outlined here merely for full understanding of the legislation around this
award program.) To qualify under this alternative path, students must have:
3Although one may be interested in the changes in the number of students achieving Level 1 or
Level 2 on the MEAP exam during the years if study, the MDE does not release extensive data
regarding this. Although the data for public schools is made availabe for some years, some years are
excluded and many times private schools are ignored. For these reasons, these breakdowns are not
shown in this study.
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1. Taken all four subject area tests
2. Received a score of Level 1 or 2 on at least two of the tests
3. Scored in the top 25 percent nationally on the SAT 1, ACT, or ACT WorkKeys
tests. 4
Students from the graduating class of 2000 were the first cohort eligible for the
awards. High school juniors (11th graders) take the exam in the spring. Therefore,
the graduating class of 2000 would have taken the exam in the spring of 1999. It
may have been anticipated that the award would indeed go into effect before the
legislation was officially passed because the Governor and other policymakers made
their intentions about this award known prior to the MEAP HST in 1999. Teachers
may have been even more aware than students of this anticipated legislation and
shared the information with their students. Students from the graduating class of
2001 certainly were aware of the award as it had already been made law by the time
those students took the MEAP HST in the spring of 2000.
All students in Michigan, regardless of family income or other characteristics, were
eligible for the awards (making this a “merit-based” scholarship). The full $2,500
yearly scholarhip was awarded for students attending college or some other form of
postsecondary training in Michigan. Students attending out-of-state institutions were
eligible for a $1,000 award. 5
Breakdowns for MEAP HST scores were not made available by the Michigan
Department of Education for the class of 1998, but the following five tables present
4For the first cohort of students, the qualifying SAT combined score was 1170 and the ACT
composite score was 24. The WorkKeys test assesses individuals’ knowledge of workplace skills, and
is often taken by students enrolled in vocational programs in secondary school. It tests skills in
the areas of applied mathematics, applied technology, listening, locating information, observation,
reading for information, teamwork, and writing (ACT WorkKeys Assessments, 2001). Students who
qualified for a scholarship via the WorkKeys test can use the funds for postsecondary vocational or
technical training only.
5In addition to these awards, students achieving certain scores on the 7th and 8th grade MEAP
tests were eligible for up to an additional $500 in scholarship funding. This is ignored in the analysis
of this study.
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the percentage of students scoring at each Level (1-4) in each subject area for public
schools only.6
Table 2.1: Class of 1999 MEAP HST results
Math Reading Science Social Studies Writing
Level 1 22.6 17.1 7.2 N/A 6.8
Level 2 41 50.2 43.8 N/A 45.7
Level 3 17.4 14.9 29.3 N/A 32.9
Level 4 18.9 17.9 19.7 N/A 14.7
Total Number of Students Tested 81,389 81,717 80,834 N/A 78,478
Keep in mind that the MEAP HST results in Table 2.1 correspond to students
who took the test in the spring of 1998. Note that the social studies subject exam
was not included in the MEAP HST given to this cohort of students. Even without
the Michigan Merit Award, over 50% of Michigan public school students scored at
Level 2 or above on every subject exam.
Table 2.2: Class of 2000 MEAP HST Results
Math Reading Science Social Studies Writing
Level 1 22.0 17.3 7.0 0.5 7.9
Level 2 42.8 52.1 48.6 23.6 50.5
Level 3 15.7 13.1 25.0 34.8 27.5
Level 4 19.5 17.5 19.5 41.1 14.1
Total Number of Students Tested 92,009 92,190 91,256 80,630 88,427
The proportion of students scoring at Level 2 or above increased with the cohort
of students taking the exam in spring of 1999 as sown in Table 2.2. At this time,
some students may have been aware via teachers or parents that the Michigan Merit
Award was likely to be passed in the Michigan legislature that year. Some students
may have not been aware, however. Regardless, these students are all considered
“treated”, albeit some “treated” by surprise.
6All data regarding MEAP scores come from the MDE’s MEAP website which can be found at
http://www.michigan.gov/mde/0,4615,7-140-22709_31168---,00.html.
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Table 2.3: Class of 2001 MEAP HST Results
Math Reading Science Social Studies Writing
Level 1 20.5 20.6 8.9 0.7 7.2
Level 2 47.9 53.6 51.4 25.9 61.3
Level 3 15.4 11.0 22.1 32.1 21.9
Level 4 16.2 14.8 17.5 41.3 9.6
Total Number of Students Tested 89,200 88,499 88,303 84,429 85,141
Percentage of MI public school students exempt or not tested are:
Math: 6.2%. Reading: 6.3%. Science: 6.6%. Social Studies: 8.2%. Writing: 8.0%.
The Number of students exempted or not tested was only made available for
classes of 2001 and 2002. The proportion of students falling into this category is
listed in the table notes. The proportion of students scoring Level 2 or above again
increased from the previous year as presented in Table 2.3
Table 2.4: Class of 2002 MEAP HST Results
Math Reading Science Social Studies Writing
Level 1 21.1 19.3 7.3 0.5 5.2
Level 2 45.9 52.0 51.9 22.5 63.0
Level 3 13.9 10.8 20.1 34.9 20.6
Level 4 19.1 17.8 20.7 42.1 11.3
Total Number of Students Tested 97,006 96,283 95,996 92,207 92,214
Percentage of MI public school students exempt or not tested are:
Math: 7.7%. Reading: 7.8%. Science: 8.0%. Social Studies: 10.3%. Writing: 10.4%.
Again, the Number of students exempted or not tested was only made available for
classes of 2001 and 2002 (those tested in the springs of 2000 and 2001, respectively).
While the number of students scoring at Level 2 or above increased in some subject
areas as made evident in Table 2.4, this did not occur in all subject exams this year.
From Table 2.5, one can determine students scoring at Level 1 or 2 did not increase
across the board in all subject exams for the graduating class of 2003. Although
student-level data is not available for use in this study, the preceding tables help to
represent those “marginal” students who may be close to scoring a Level 2, but only
score a Level 3. As you can see, the proportion of students scoring Level 3 seemed
20
Table 2.5: Class of 2003 MEAP HST Results
Math Reading Science Social Studies Writing
Level 1 16.5 15.0 7.7 0.7 4.6
Level 2 43.3 51.8 53.4 24.8 56.3
Level 3 12.5 12.8 15.6 31.9 24.8
Level 4 27.6 20.5 23.3 42.5 14.3
Total Number of Students Tested 102,928 102,133 102,088 98,056 98,599
to decrease, on average, over this period. Since no formal individual-level analysis is
possible, this may only be seen as anecdotal evidence that the Michigan Merit Award
pushed students into higher scores (i.e., made students try harder on the MEAP exam
to score a Level 2 or better to qualify for the award).
21
Chapter 3
Empirical Study
3.1 Research Question
Although the underlying goal of the Michigan Merit Award, as stated before, was
to “increase access to postsecondary education and reward Michigan high school
graduates who have demonstrated academic achievement” (MMA, 1999), the focus
of this study is not to investigate the effects of the award on college attendance
or completion. This study looks to study the effects of this merit-based award on
high school graduation rates, a necessary first step to college attendance. This is
of interest for several reasons. Proponents of the law in Michigan argued that it
would increase access to higher education for all Michigan students. Opponents
of the law argued that it was discriminatory in nature. The latter group argued
that the Michigan Merit Award would give college scholarships to students in well-
off districts where MEAP exam scores were already higher than in underperforming
districts. Furthermore, many of the underperforming districts had a much higher
presence of nonwhite students leading some to the claim of racial discrimination. It
was viewed as so discriminatory by some, that a coalition of groups headed by the
American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan filed a suit against the State of Michigan
in federal court. Initially, the lawyers representing these ACLU-led groups asked for
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a preliminary injunction to block the implementation of the Michigan scholarship
program (White et. al v. Engler et al.). Ultimately, the Michigan Department of
Education enacted a revised verison of the proposed Michigan Merit Award to be
enacted using the criteria and qualification paths described in Section 2.3.
It goes without saying that it is necessary for a student to complete secondary
school before matriculating at a college or university. In other words, the student not
only has to perform well on the standardized exam, but graduate in order to receive
the award. Since students in the state of Michigan could drop out of school at age
16, some students did not take the MEAP exam as a junior nor did they graduate.
Perhaps students could be incentived to not only try on the MEAP standardized exam
with an award like the Michigan Merit Award, but to stay in school and graduate
as well. This could hold especially true for the “disenfranchised” students discussed
in Section 1.4. Perhaps it did not have that effect on graduation rates at all. It
could be the case that the Michigan Merit Award benefitted students who would
have graduated high school and gone to college regardless of the scholarship program.
The question remains: Do these financial rewards for college education induce high
school students in Michigan to perform better while in secondary school and therefore
increase high school graduation rates in the state? High school graduation rates could
also increase while average performance could decrease (e.g., some students could
equalize effort across subjects). Regardless of students’ academic performance gains
or losses (in terms of high school grades or GPA), it is still feasible to imagine the
MMA leading to gains in high school graduation attainment.
3.2 Data
The data used for this empirical research comes from school district-level data
collected from the National Center for Education Statistics Common Core of Data
(CCD). Data collected regarding the MEAP exam and other data specific to Michigan
come from Center for Educational Performance and Information (CEPI) and the
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Michigan Department of Education (MDE). Employment data comes the Bureau
of Labor Statistics (BLS). Data is collected at the district level except yearly
unemplyment rates, which are collected at the state level.
The time period studied covers the years 1998 to 2003. States used in this study
come from the same census region (Midwest) and division (East North Central) as
Michigan and include Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and, of course, Michigan. All
states will be used as control states in one specification, but a subset of these states
will be used in the other analysis of this study. Although the total number of districts
each year may vary over the six-year study period, a total of 12,657 observations
of school districts are used in this study. Missing values of control variables were
interprolated and extraoplated prior to regression analysis to increase the statistical
power of the estimation.
3.3 Estimation
A difference-in-differences approach is used to study the effects of the Michigan
Merit Award on graduation rates in the state of Michigan. As explained in
the introduction, this estimation method is of common use when studying college
scholarship programs. The model specifications were chosen with some application
from education production functions. The “educational output” in this study
corresponds to high school graduation rates. There may be many “inputs” that
affect graduation rates, but the ones chosen here come from data availability and prior
research applications. Some ideal controls (educational “inputs”) could include family
background (including family income, education, etc.), prior academic achievement,
quality of early education, exposure to educational-enhancing activities outside the
classroom, and others. Since much focus is given to “marginal” students- those on
the fence about going college or completing high school, student-level data would
be ideal to more precisely pick up these marginal effects. Data of this sort would
also allow for better identification of the mean effect of students on the margin of
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proficiency (Level 2 or above) on the MEAP exam. Classroom-level data may also be
more ideal in those regards, but again, the Michigan Dept. of Education only makes
district-level data available to the public.
This paper uses three different model specifications in the analysis:
1. The first specification is a two-way fixed effects model that also controls for
state time trends. The model is formally described by Equation 3.1.
2. The second specification will use year-by-year effects that allow for pre- and
post-period time trends. The estimating equation for this specification is
Equation 3.2
3. The third specification allows for flexible interactions between the regressor of
interest and other control variables. This final model is formally displayed in
Equation 3.3
All model specifications will use (in various ways) the following controls1 :
1. Racial makeup
2. Expenditures per student
3. Low-Income makeup (proxied by those eligible for free or reduced lunch)
4. State-level unemployment rates
5. District size (as measured by number of high school students per district)
Items 1-3 (race, expenditures, and low income) are controlled for because of
the common knowledge that variables of this sort have a strong association with
educational outcomes as seen in education and economics literature. “Nonwhite”
refers to those students who happen to be African-American, Hispanic, Asian or
Pacific Islander, or Native American. Item 4 (unemployment rates) are controlled
1These controls will be the vector Xist in all three estimating equations
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for because graduating high school is human capital decision and there may be
substituion occurring. Also, a weakening economy may be reflective of outmigration
or other factors affecting district-level graduation rates. Students must weigh the
option to stay in school against the opportunity cost of working.2 There may also be
impacts other than substitution occuring in the labor market that may have an effect
on graduation rates. Item 5 (number of students in each district) is controlled for
because of the wide range of districts in the panel. District size can be correlated with
urbanicity which, in turn, could be correlated with lower graduation rates. This is
a problem with many inner-city schools where educational outcomes, like graduation
rates, can be low in comparison to their non-urban counterparts. On the other hand,
district growth may be reflective of in-migration to the district, which could point to
good outcomes. This will be discussed further in the estimation results.
High school graduation rates (GradRate) is the outcome variable of interest and
will be the regrassand in all model specifications that will be spelled out in later
sections.3 MMAst is a dummy variable which represents districts in Michigan after
the Michigan Merit Award scholarship program was put into place. In other words,
this variable will be equal to 1 if district i is in Michigan in the year 2000 and after.
This can be thought of as an interaction term of two other dummy varibles, MI and
MEAP . MI would be = 1 if the district is in Michigan and MEAP would be = 1 if
the award program was enacted in Michigan in 2000. In other words, MEAP = 1 in
the year 2000 and onward. MMA is the interaction of these two terms. Therefore,
MMA = MI ∗MEAP .
We will use all three specifications in both analyses conducted in this paper.
Hausman tests rejected random effects in favor of fixed effects in each specification.
Hence, fixed effects estimation will be used in each model. The chi-squared test
2It is important to note that in Michigan, a student can drop out of school at age 16 without
parental consent. This law has been changed and will affect the class of 2016. At that time, all
students must stay in school until the age of 18. This is out of the time frame of this analysis.
3Graduation rate is defined here as number of students graduating divided by number of enrolled
high school seniors. Rates over 100% are rare but feasible because of immigration or early graduation.
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statistic for each specification was large enough in each specification to rule in favor
of the alternative hypothesis that fixed effects is consistent (but random effects is
not) over the null hypothesis that both random and fixed effects are consistent (but
only random effects is efficient).
3.4 Broad Set of Control States
We will first conduct this difference-in-differences analysis with all other Midwest
East North Central census division states. This includes Michigan (our “treatment”
state), Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and Wisconsin (our “control” states). The districts in
these nonexperimental states are also ideal for use as controls because these states
did not have a scholarship like the Michigan Merit Award during the study period
from 1998 to 2003. The main identifying assumption is that in the absence of the
Michigan Merit Award, Michigan districts would have been on the same graduation
rate trajectory as control districts, conditional on other covariates. That is, districts
in nearby states are adequate counterfactuals for Michigan outcomes.
Table 3.1 shows the means and standard deviations of the outcome variable and
each control variable for every state in the study. The last two columns show the
mean and standard deviation of all control states combined. Before the passage of
the Michigan Merit Award in 2000, Michigan had the highest graduation rates of
any of the other census division states with a graduation rate of 92.9%. The state
with the lowest graduation rate during this period was Ohio, with 87.1%. Before
the MMA, Michigan had graduation rates 3.1 points higher than the combined mean
of all the school districts in the other census division states. Michigan also had
the highest percentage of nonwhite students in its districts, accounting for 11.5% of
students, before the MMA. This is 3.9 points higher than the than the other districts’
combined mean of 7.6%. The state with the lowest percentage of nonwhite students
was Indiana with 5.6%. The state that spent the most on instruction expenditures per
student prior to MMA was Wisconsin, with an average of $4,442 spent per student.
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The lowest during this period was Ohio with an average of $3,363 spent per student
on instruction. The average of all control districts was $3,683 spent per student.
Pre-MMA, Michigan had the highest incidence of students eligible for free or reduced
lunch with 27.8% of students eligible. Ohio had the lowest incidence pre-MMA with
only 19.6% eligible. The control state average pre-MMA was 20.7%. The highest
unemployment rate of the census division states occurred in Illinois in 1998-1999
with a rate of 4.5%. The lowest unemployment rate of 2.9% occurred in Indiana. The
average of all four control states during this period was approximately 3.9%. Indiana
showed the most students per district pre-2000 with approximately 3,364 high school
students per district. Wisconsin had the lowest average district size during the pre-
MMA years with an average of 2,256 high school students per district. The control
state average pre-MMA district size was approximately 2,789 high school students
per district.
After the passage of the Michigan Merit Award, the “ranking” of these states in
terms of the means of the variables used in this study changed in some cases. The
highest average graduation rates occurred in Wisconsion at a rate of 93.4%. This is
only 0.2 points higher than the post-MMA graduation rates in Michigan, yet 2.5 points
higher than the mean graduation rates of all four control states. Michigan still had
the highest percentage of nonwhite students with 13.8%. Once again, Indiana had the
lowest percentage of nonwhite students with 6.8%. The average of all control districts
was 8.9%. After the MMA was passed, Wisconsion spent the most on instruction
dollars spent per student with approximately $5,153 spent per student. Ohio was
once again the lowest with $4,144 spent per student. The average amount of dollars
spent per student on instruction for all control state districts increased $793 before
the passage of the MMA to $4,476 spent per student. Michigan again saw the highest
incidence of students eligible for free or reduced lunch with 30.1% eligible, while Ohio
remained the lowest with 21.5% eligible. Unemployment rates rose significantly in
the years 2001-2003. Illinois continued to have the highest average unemployment
rates of any state in the census division with 6.18%. Indiana remained the lowest
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with approximately 4.9%. All states saw nearly a two percentage point increase in
unemployment rates in this post-MMA period compared to the pre-MMA period.
Indiana continued to have the highest amount of students per district post-MMA
with an average of approximately 3,401 high schoolers per district. Wisconsin showed
the lowest district size post-2000 once again. The average number of high school
students per district actually decreased from the pre-2000 period to approximately
2,252 students on average. All control states as a whole saw a decrease in the average
number of high schoolers per district as the post-MMA number of high schoolers per
district decreased to approximately 2,785.
Simple Difference in Means Using All Control States
Table 3.2: Difference in Means Using All Census Division States
Pre-MMA Post-MMA Difference
Michigan 0.929 0.932 0.003
Control States 0.898 0.909 0.011
Diff-in-Diff -0.008
Table 3.2 shows the simple difference-in-differences of mean graduation rates.
The first difference is calculated by taking the difference between the post-treatment
(Post-MMA) graduation rate mean and the pre-treatment (Pre-MMA) mean. The
difference-in-differences comes from subtracting the difference in the control states
from the difference in the experimental state. According to this simple difference
in means, a 0.8 percentage point relative decrease in graduation rates was seen in
the experimental state (Michigan) after the passage of the Michigan Merit Award
legislation.
While the difference in means tells us something about the way the outcome
variable (graduation rates) changed before and after the program took effect, it says
little to nothing about the cause(s) of the relative change. While the award program
in Michigan may very well have something to do with the change in graduation
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rates, there may be other factors that are moving graduation rates as well. A simple
difference in means cannot account for this. We move ahead by running regression
analysis with these same four states’ school districts as controls. The next section may
very well be valid in its difference-in-differences analysis as the number of observations
is quite large and includes states in the general geographic area of Michigan.4
Estimation Results
Our first estimating equation uses a two-way fixed effects model.
GradRateist = α0 +MMAstα1 + Xistβ + θi + θt + θ(t)s + ist (3.1)
In this equation, GradRateist represents the outcome variable of interest, high
school graduation rates. The parameter α0 represents the intercept. MMAst is
the treatment dummy described in an earlier section. Xist is a vector of controls
spelled out previously. θi represents district fixed effects. These effects are those
time-invariant characteristics that are unique to the district. The parameter θt is
used to control for year fixed effects. θ(t)s controls for state-specific linear trends in
graduation rates due to unobserved factors. Fixed effects, captured by θi, will cover
time-invariant heterogeneity, but not dynamics affecting Michigan more or less than
other states used in the analysis (e.g., population outflows). ist is the random error
term.
Table 3.3 presents the coefficient estimates for the fixed effects estimation. This
first specification indicates that there were, on average, approximately 3.3 percentage
point gains in mean graduation rates after the introduction of the MMA. Another
interesting result pertains to the statistical significance of the coefficient estimate on
instructional spending. According to this model, a $1,000 increase in instruction
spending per student corresponds to about a 2.9 percentage point gain in mean
graduation rates, on average. Some may find this contrary to the findings of Hanushek
4A recent discussion of diff-in-diff estimation can be found in Bertrand et al. (2004).
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Table 3.3: Two-Way Fixed Effects Model Using
All Census Division States
Variable Coefficient Estimate
MMA 3.282***
(0.942)
Proportion Nonwhite -0.014
(0-100) (0.155)
Instruction Dollars 2.878*
(in thousands of $) (1.642)
Free or Red Lunch Elig -0.036
(0-100) (0.084)
Unemployment Rate 0.602
(0-100) (0.562)
District Size -0.043
(in hundreds) (0.052)
1 Values in parantheses denote cluster robust standard
errors.
2 N=12,657 district-years
3 * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** the 5% level,
*** the 1% level.
(1996) where it was posited that increases in per-pupil spending do not have much
effect on student outcomes. However, this spending corresponds to money spent on
instruction only. A gain in mean graduation rates of around 2 to 3 percentage points
is quite significant with high levels of graduation, say in the 90% range (as is not
uncommon in this data set), although it should be noted that a $1,000 increase in
instructional spending is quite large, accounting for more than one standard deviation.
All other control variables in this specification are statistically insignificant.
Our second model uses a year-by-year effects approach. The estimating equation
is described below:
GradRateist = α0 +
2003∑
y=1999
(MIs ∗ Y EARy) + Xistβ + θi + θt + θ(t)s + ist (3.2)
As in Equation 3.1, GradRateist represents our educational “output”, graduation
rates.
∑2003
y=1999(MIs ∗Y EARy) disaggregates the “Michigan effect” by year, omitting
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1998. θ(t)s again controls for linear trends in graduation rates due to unobserved
factors, but Michigan’s trend was excluded for collinearity. θt is used to control for
year fixed effects in control states. It is important to note that this model is trying
to pick up the gains and/or losses in Michigan district graduation rates year by year.
θi again represents district fixed effects, Xist is the same vector of controls, and ist
again represents the errror term.
Table 3.4: Year-by-Year Effects Model Using
All Census Division States
Variable Coefficient Estimate
Proportion Nonwhite -0.010
(0-100) (0.153)
Instruction Dollars 2.992*
(in thousands of $) (1.643)
Free or Red Lunch Elig -0.032
(0-100) (0.083)
Unemployment Rate -0.469
(0-100) (0.503)
District Size -0.040
(in hundreds) (0.052)
MIyear1999 1.648**
(0.695)
MIyear2000 1.804**
(0.806)
MIyear2001 3.014***
(1.084)
MIyear2002 -2.616
(2.160)
MIyear2003 -0.532
(2.157)
1 Values in parantheses denote cluster robust standard
errors.
2 N=12,657 district-years
3 * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** the 5% level,
*** the 1% level.
Table 3.4 presents the coefficient estimates for the model specification controlling
for year-to-year effects. It appears that gaining trends in graduation rates were
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occurring in Michigan before the introduction of the MMA. Although there were
gains in graduation rates seen in 2000 and 2001 (relative to 1998), part of these gains
were a continuation of trends seen as late as 1999. We could certainly expect gains
in mean graduation rates in the years 2000 and 2001 as these two years’ cohorts of
graduating students were both “treated” by the implementation of the MMA. We
see larger gains in graduation rates for the class of 2001, with over a 3 percentage
point relative increase to mean graduation rates in 1998. The class of 2000 sees an
approximate 1.8 percentage point relative increase in graduation rates compared to
rates in 1998. Recall that the class of 2000 may be considered “treated by surprise”
as the class of 2001 was fully aware of the MMA when they took the MEAP HST
the prior year. This may give some reason as to why gains in 2001 are larger in
magnitude than the gains seen in 2000. The lack of statistical significance of the
disaggregated Michigan-by-year effects in 2002 and 2003 may point to the idea that
graduation rates reverted to 1998 levels after 2001. As in the first specification,
the coefficient estimate tied to instructional spending is significant, indicating that
a $1,000 increase in spending per student s correlated with a nearly 3 percentage
point increase in mean graduation rates, on average. This is approximately the same
magnitude as the coefficient estimate in the first model.
Our final model uses interaction terms with the MMA dummy to better
understand the effects of the award program, along with other controls, on district-
level graduation rates. This model will will assist in presenting the association
between control variables and graduation rates in Michigan school districts after the
MMA was implemented. It allows the effect of other Michigan inputs to change after
2000 rather than confound their influence with the Michigan Merit Award. A formal
display of the model specification is below5:
GradRateist = α0+MMAstα1+Xistβ1+MMAst ∗X˜istβ2+θi+θt+θ(t)s+ist (3.3)
5This specification is motivated by the “regression adjustment” approach described by Wooldridge
(2010)
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The coefficient corresponding to the MMA dummy will represent the average
treatment effect. All right-hand side variables have been explained in either
Equations 3.1 or 3.2, except for one. X˜ist is a vector of de-meaned components
of Xist, such that x˜ist = xist − x¯, where x¯ represents the sample mean of the variable
xist.
Table 3.5: Interactions Model Using All Census
Division States
Variable Coefficient Estimate
MMA -3.770**
(1.641)
Proportion Nonwhite -0.040
(0-100) (0.173)
Instruction Dollars 2.105*
(in thousands of $) (1.128)
Free or Red Lunch Elig -0.022
(0-100) (0.068)
Unemployment Rate 1.601**
(0-100) (0.653)
District Size -0.061
(in hundreds) (0.082)
MMA*Nonwhite 0.042
(0.059)
MMA*Instr 4.188
(3.051)
MMA*LunchStatus -0.143
(0.163)
MMA*Unemp -3.734***
(0.932)
MMA*DistrictSize -0.006
(in hundreds) (0.010)
1 Values in parantheses denote robust standard errors.
2 N=12,657
3 * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** the 5% level,
*** the 1% level.
The coefficient estimates of the interactions model are shown above in Table 3.5.
Naturally the estimates of interest in this model are the coefficient estimates
corresponding to the interaction terms. A Wald test indicated these interactions are
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jointly significant. The coefficient estimates from this specification show that after
2000, a marginal increase in unemployment led to an approximate 3.7 percentage
point additional loss in mean graduation rates. Each respective association between
nonwhite, instructional spending, lunch status, and district size did not significantly
change in Michigan district, post-MMA as shown by the statistical insignificance
of the corresponding interaction term coefficient estimates. In this third model
specification, where we allow other Michigan inputs to change after MMA was
enacted, we see that Michigan in 2000 and after, the MMA is actually associated
with lower graduation rates. The post-MMA era in Michigan is associated with a
3.77 percentage point decrease in mean graduation rates, on average.
3.5 Limited Control States
The study will now move its focus to a smaller set of control states. These control
states were chosen based on the assumptions needed for difference-in-differences
models.
The Case for Districts in Indiana and Wisconsin as Controls
The empirical strategy used prior is one approach to a valid difference-in-differences
estimation of the treatment effect of the Michigan Merit Award. It does seem to make
sense to use school districts from states in a similar geographic region as a control
group for this analysis. However, proper difference-in-differences analysis depends
on one important underlying assumption: conditional trends would have been the
same in the absence of treatment. In this case, that means that trends in graduation
rates would have to be the same before the MMA was put into effect. This implies
that the trajectory of graduation rates in the treatment school districts (in Michigan)
would be (approximately) parallel to the trajectory of graduation rates in the control
districts prior to the year 2000. To repeat, the main identifying assumption is that in
the absence of the Michigan Merit Award, Michigan districts would have been on the
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same graduation rate trajectory as control districts, conditional on other covariates.
Although no strict test of this assumption exists for non-experimental applications,
trends in graduation rates prior to 2000 will give us an idea of how comparable
Michigan and other states were without MMA.
Figure 3.1: Trends in Graduation Rates
Fitted trends in graduation rates in school districts using all four states mentioned
before (Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and Wisonsin) are not parallel to the graduation trends
in Michigan plotted over time as shown in Figure 3.1. In fact, graduation gains were
steeper outside of Michigan, which could bias difference-in-differences estimates of
the MMA effect. While the number of observations will be decreased by omitting
some districts, matching Michigan districts with more appropriate counterfactuals
may provide more accurate estimates of the effect of the MMA. Every combination
was considered. Using districts from Indiana and Wisconsin as controls appears as
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if it lends itself as the best fit to the main identifying assumption of difference-in-
differences analysis. As illustrated in Figure 3.2, trends in graduation rates are nearly
parallel prior to the year 2000 when graduation rates in Indiana and Wisconsin are
plotted against those in Michigan over time. For this reason, we will see if Section 3.4
results are robust to limiting the set of control states to Indiana and Wisconsin.
Figure 3.2: Trends in Graduation Rates: Michigan and Indiana/Wisconsin
Descriptive Statistics and Difference in Means
Descriptive statistics from school districts in Indiana and Wisconsin individually can
be found in Table 3.1 and will not be repeated here. Descriptive statistics for Michigan
school districts will be repeated for comparison to the desciptive statistics of the
control districts (in Indiana and Wisconsin) used in this analysis.
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Table 3.6: Descriptive Statistics for Experimental and Nonexperimental Districts
Experimental Nonexperimental
MI IN and WI
Variable Pre-MMA Post-MMA Pre-MMA Post-MMA
Graduation Rate 0.929 0.932 0.917 0.926
(0.135) (0.124) (0.082) (0.074)
Proportion Nonwhite 0.115 0.138 0.057 0.068
(0-1) (0.184) (0.207) (0.104) (0.114)
Instruction Dollars per Student 3.873 4.552 4.079 4.789
(in thousands of $) (0.597) (0.718) 0.(657) (0.725)
Free or reduced lunch 0.278 0.301 0.221 0.237
(0-1) (0.176) (0.177) (0.123) (0.132)
Unemployment rate 3.900 6.168 3.070 5.010
(0-100) (0.100) (0.775) (0.167) (0.514)
Total High School Students 30.431 30.196 27.386 27.529
(in hundreds) (84.024) (77.705) (52.529) (51.877)
(0.1) (0.775) (0.167) (0.514)
N (district-years) 1095 1654 1347 2007
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We can see that in comparison to the means of graduation rates in control districts
in the last analysis (as seen in Table 3.1), graduation rates rates, on average, seem
higher using only Indiana and Wisconsin districts as controls. While the average
graduation rates in Michigan were once again higher than the average graduation
rates in the control states, it was not by a drastic amount. Average graduation rates
in Michigan prior to the year 2000 when the MMA was initiated were approximately
93%, while the average rates in the two control states were approximately 92%; this
is only a 1 point difference. The average percentage of nonwhite students in Michigan
was almost double that of the control states used here before and after the MMA
was enacted. The average amount of money spent on instruction pre- and post-MMA
was approximately $200 higher in the control states used here. The percentage of
students eligible for free or reduced lunch was about five percentage points higher
than in the control states, pre- and post-2000. While the average unemployment
rate was higher than Michigan prior to the Michigan Merit Award legislation, it
only overtook the average rate in the control states by about 0.8 points. After the
passage of the Michigan Merit Award in 2000, unemployment rates in Michigan were
approximately 1.2 points higher than the average unemployment rates in Indiana and
Wisconsin. The average number of high school students (our measure of district size)
was approximately 300 students greater in Michigan in both periods.
Table 3.7: Difference in Means Using IN and WI Districts as Controls
Pre-MMA Post-MMA Difference
Michigan 0.929 0.932 0.003
Control States 0.917 0.926 0.009
Diff-in-Diff -0.006
Table 3.7 shows the simple difference-in-difference of means of graduation rates.
The differences are calculated as in the last analysis. According this simple difference
in means, a 0.6 percentage point relative decrease in graduation rates was seen in
the experimental state (Michigan) after the passage of the Michigan merit Award
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legislation. Again, it is imporant to remember that the difference in means tells us
something about the way the outcome variable (graduation rates) changed before
and after the program took effect, it says little to nothing about the cause(s) of
the relative change. While the award program in Michigan may very well have
something to do with the change in graduation rates, there may be other factors that
are moving graduation rates as well. A simple difference in means cannot account
for this. We move ahead by running regression analysis with the school districts
in Indiana and Wisconsin as controls. The next section is solid in its validity as
a true difference-in-differences analysis by meeting the parallel trend assumption of
difference-in-differences analysis.
Estimation Results
Table 3.8: Two-Way Fixed Effects Model Using
Limited Control States
Variable Coefficient Estimate
MMA 3.821***
(1.291)
Proportion Nonwhite -0.027
(0-100) (0.173)
Instruction Dollars 3.877
(in thousands of $) (2.811)
Free or Red Lunch Elig -0.190
(0-100) (0.237)
Unemployment Rate 1.731
(0-100) (1.369)
District Size -0.046**
(in hundreds) (0.022)
1 Values in parantheses denote cluster robust standard
errors.
2 N=6,444 district-years
3 * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** the 5% level,
*** the 1% level.
Table 3.8 lists the coefficient estimates from the fixed effects estimating equation
using only Wisconsin and Indiana districts as controls. This model indicates that
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the introduction of the MMA led to an approximate 3.8 percentage point gain in
mean graduation rates, on average. The coefficient estimate associated with district
size is statistically significant and indicates that an increase of 100 high school
students is associated with about a 0.05 percentage point decrease in mean graduation
rates, on average. All other control variables appear insignificant in this particular
specification.
Table 3.9: Year-by-Year Effects Model Using
Limited Control States
Variable Coefficient Estimate
Proportion Nonwhite -0.024
(0-100) (0.171)
Instruction Dollars 4.082
(in thousands of $) (2.841)
Free or Red Lunch Elig -0.184
(0-100) (0.235)
Unemployment Rate -1.441
(0-100) (1.763)
District Size -0.043*
(in hundreds) (0.022)
MIyear1999 1.298
(0.830)
MIyear2000 1.130
(1.231)
MIyear2001 3.0552
(2.600)
MIyear2002 -1.004
(4.665)
MIyear2003 2.041
(5.927)
1 Values in parantheses denote cluster robust standard
errors.
2 N=6,444 district-years
3 * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** the 5% level,
*** the 1% level.
The results in Table 3.9 come from model using Michigan year-by-year effects.
Using only a stricter set of control states, all Michigan year-by-year effects appear
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statistically insignificant in this specification. If one were using this analysis alone, it
may lead one to suggest that there were no significant gains in mean graduation rates
in Michigan post-MMA. The same specification using the broader set of control states
told a different story as is shown in Table 3.4. This model (using these controls) shows
that a marginal additional of 100 high school students corresponds to an approximate
0.04 percentage point decrease in mean graduation rates, on average. This could lead
some to support the idea that larger school districts are correlated to urbanicity,
which can be correlated with lower educaitonal outcomes like high school graduation.
Table 3.10: Interactions Model Using Limited
Control States
Variable Coefficient Estimate
MMA 0.810
(1.680)
Proportion Nonwhite -0.073
(0-100) (0.206)
Instruction Dollars 2.436
(in thousands of $) (1.994)
Free or Red Lunch Elig -0.155
(0-100) (0.195)
Unemployment Rate 3.571*
(0-100) (1.838)
District Size -0.081
(in hundreds) (0.069)
MMA*Nonwhite 0.040
(0.061)
MMA*Instr 3.965
(2.523)
MMA*LunchStatus -0.123
(0.143)
MMA*Unemp -3.068***
(1.170)
MMA*DistrictSize -0.007
(in hundreds) (0.009)
1 Values in parantheses denote robust standard errors.
2 N=6,444 district-years
3 * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** the 5% level,
*** the 1% level.
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The estimation results from the interactions model using limited control states
is presented in Table 3.10. As in the same specification using the broader set of
control states, the only interaction term with statistical significance is the interaction
term with unemplyment rates. According to this analysis, a one percent increase
in unemployment is associated with an approximate 3.1 additional loss in mean
graduation rates in Michigan after the MMA was enacted. Given the statistical
insignificance of all other interaction terms (using both a broader and stricter set of
control districts), particularly those terms interacting with lunch status (recall that
this is a proxy for economically disadvantaged students) and proportion nonwhite, one
may find it hard to argue that the MMA had an undue burden on mean graduation
rates for poor and nonwhite students. However, this still does not say it does not have
an adverse effect on these groups on college matriculation or completion. Unlike our
findings from this model specificaiton using a broader set of control states, this model
does not suggest any association between Michigan in the post-MMA and graduation
rates. The estimate is insignificant here, suggesting that the MMA had no impact
on graduation rates when evaluated against a set of districts with similar trends in
pre-2000 graduation rates.
A summary and analysis of all specifications will be discussed in the Conclusion.
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Chapter 4
Conclusion
4.1 Conclusions From This Study
With rising costs of college education and the high returns to education, governments
are trying to introduce new ways to help citizens, namely young people, obtain
a postsecondary education. Scholarships have become a way of giving students
the opportunity to go to college without the constraints of debt. One obstacle
facing policymakers when creating these scholarships is the perceived “fairness” of
scholarships. While some believe need-based scholarships are needed and perceived
as “fair”, others believe merit-based scholarships are the best way to award hard-
working students with a college education.
Numerous types of merit-based scholarships exist and the qualifications for the
awards differ. Some are based on high school grade point average. Others are based
on college entrance exams like the ACT or SAT. Still others, like the Michigan Merit
Award, are based on test scores from exams that are typically used for measuring
educational progress. While the goal of policymakers is to increase college attainment,
whether in the form of college matriculation or college completion, there could be
other effects. A natural effect could be on an intermediate step between taking a
standardized test and attending college: high school graduation.
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Simple difference in means analysis, although certainly not the focus of this study,
suggests a downward trend in graduation rates after the passage of the MMA. One
reason the introduction of the MMA may cause downward pressure on district-level
graduation rates is the “give up” factor. Perhaps some students, after not reaching
the threshold to receive scholarship money, give up on the idea of finishing high school.
Perhaps peer effects lends itself to this outcome as students’ peers reach the minimum
requirements and make plans for postsecondary school as those that did not reach
the threshold feel disgruntled with the outcome.
This paper further studies the effect of the Michigan Merit Award with regression
analysis and posits some interesting results. While some specifications find that
the introduction of the Michigan Merit Award had a statistically significant average
positive impact on district-level high school graduation rates, the overall results are
inconclusive. The simple two-way fixed effects specifications showed positive impacts
on graduation rates after the MMA legislation. Some students may have put forth
little or no effort on the MEAP exams prior to the award legislation and, when
actually trying, surprise themselves with the outcome. Perhaps they did not believe
college was an option before, but with the MMA, they can move on to college. These
same students may have been prone to dropping out of high school before completion.
However, with this thought process, they stay in school to graduate in order to receive
the MMA. This could be one explanation for why the MMA is associated with higher
graduation levels.
In the analysis using districts from all census division states and allowing for
Michigan year-by-year effects, we see that the post-MMA era is assocaited with higher
graduation rates. The largest gains were seen in 2001, but appear to be continuations
in existing trends going as far back as 1999. This model, using these broader controls,
also seem to point to a drop off in graduation rate gains after 2001. The year-by-year
analysis using a stricter set of controls sheds little to no light on these gains given the
statistical insignificance of the year-by-year estimates. They do, however, seem to be
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somewhat in line with the results from the same model using the larger set of control
states.
In the final model specification, the effect of Michigan inputs other than the MMA
are allowed to change after 2000 rather than confound their influence with MMA by
utilizing interaction terms. In this model where all census division states were used
as controls, the introduction of the MMA is associated with lower levels of mean
district graduation rates. When a stricter set of control districts were used that more
closely mirrored Michigan trends prior to 2000, the effect of the MMA on graduation
rates is insignificant. This specification, using either the stricter set of broader set of
controls, shows a negative effect on graduation rates when unemployment rises in the
post-MMA era.
Some other significant estimates are worth mentioning. In certain model
specifications carried out in this paper, dollars spent on instruction per student showed
positive impacts on district-level graduation rates. Some may conclude that this helps
reject the idea that increasing money spent on students in school does little to increase
educational outcomes as suggested by Hanushek (1996) and other researchers. As
stated before, this money only reflects money spent on instruction, not generalized
school funding. Two specifications (utilizing a stricter set of controls) saw negative
correlation between district size and graduation rates and could point to fact the
district size is correlated with urbanicity which, in turn, is correlated with lower
graduation rates. The third specification, using both sets of controls, showed little
evidence of disparate impact on nonwhite or economically disadvantaged students in
regards to high school graduation in the post-MMA time period.
The first specification in both analyses indicate between approximately 3.3 to 3.8
percentage point gains in mean graduation rates after the introduction of the MMA.
The second model specification in the first analysis predicts that part of these gains
were continuations in existing trends going as far back as 1999. The third model
specification, where the effect of control variables are allowed to change rather than
confound their influence with the MMA on graduatrion rates, indicates lower levels
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of graduation after the MMA was introduced. The second and third specifications
in the second analysis produce a statistically insignificant estimate of the influence
of the MMA on graduation rates. Given all of this, results are inconclusive on net.
However, the analysis as a whole tends to rule out the hypothesis that the Michigan
Merit Award increased high school graduation rates.
4.2 Suggestions for Further Research
Very little economics research has been conducted studying the Michigan Merit
Award. Most of the academic literature surrounding the MMA has been done in
the fields of education and law research.1 It is not surprising that both of these fields
have a interest in a program of this nature, but an economist’s perspective would
help shape the entire research regarding this program.
A great stride forward in studying the impacts of the MMA would be to look into
its implications at the classroom, or, better yet, student level. With less aggregated
data, economists and other researchers could better ascertain the indirect impact (if
any) of the Michigan Merit Award on high school graduation propensity. Student-
level data lends itself to the ability to control for more variation. Individual students’
background data, past academic history, socioeconomic status, etc. would help with
a thorough explanationof who this award affects the most and how it affects them.
This would also be useful for studying the effects of the MMA (or other awards of
this type) on students on the margin about attending college. A closer look at the
impacts of this scholarship program could give policymakers more knowledge on how
to build a successful scholarship program with the intended incentives built into the
program correctly and unintended consequences to be examined.
1See Heller and Rogers (2003) for much of the research done thus far.
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